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ABSTRACT 
The goal of the Human Factors Engineering (HFE) pilot projeet undertaken by NASA on the 
Space Station Processing Facility (SSPF) at Kennedy Space Center, Florida, is to demonstrate 
the advantages of using Human Factors to support NASA Safety. The primary objective of the 
project is to demonstrate how Human Factors can assist in decreasing the causes of accidents 
by reducing error producing situations. The project began with a review of design drawings for 
the SSPF, in which all Human Factors (HF) concerns were identified especially those that 
affected personnel safety, payload protection, and operational efficiency. Visits to other KSC 
facilities produced insights that could be applied to the drawing critiques when the drawings 
were not sufficient to disclose how the facility's characteristics would fulfill operational needs. 
Overall, the drawing review revealed a broad range of HF and Safety concerns. When possible, 
these concerns were discussed with the appropriate engineering personnel to effect workable 
solutions. To date, some of these HF & Safety concerns have been resolved by incorporating 
HF principles. Thus, this project has reduced potential problems that can contribute to 
accidents and costly delays, such as the Magellan Spacecraft incident in October of 1988. 
This incident typifies payload processing problems that can develop unexpectedly within any 
processing facility when Human Factors issues are either ignored or overlooked in the initial 
design of the spacecraft or in developing appropriate service and checkout procedures. 
Although the problem occurred on a spacecraft, this type of problem also could easily occur 
within a processing facility, on payloads that are being processed, or on the ground support 
equipment being used to process the payloads. In addition, this projeet has led to the evaluation 
of candidate methods for the implementation of HF. Among these, a means of conducting HF 
evaluations during Engineering Prototyping in a Computer Aided Design environment. This 
innovative technique is expected to demonstrate the Safety adv!lntage and substantial cost 
savings of incorporating HF principles. 
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Human Factors Engineering applied to 
NASA's Space Station Processing Facil-
ity 
Although many of the systems being devel-
oped for NASA embrace leading edge technolo-
gies, some of those developed for ground based 
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facilities do not. Currently, systems found in 
ground based facilities lack documented policy 
guides that ensure the application of Human 
Factors (HF) or the use of ergonomically de-
signed equipment. These systems should ben-
efit from the application of HF standards 
because the standards can reduce the likeli-
hood of accidents and injuries. These deficien-
cies were recognized by KSC personnel as far 
back as the early 1970s when Design Engi-
neering tried to alleviate this concern by es-
tablishing its own documentation guidelines, 
in a Guide for Design Engineering of 
Ground Support Equipment and Facili-
ties for Use at Kennedy Space Center 
(KSC-DE-512-SM) (1). This document at-
tempts to address some of the Human Engi-
neering issues of concern. The few HF para-
graphs in this document may be contrasted 
with the comprehensive treatment found in 
MIL-STD-1472D(9). Compoundingthisprob-
lem is the lack of skilled Human Factors 
personnel at KSC to implement the 
st.andards of either KSC-DE-512-SM (1) or 
MIL-STD-14720 (9). 
To determine how Human Factors standards 
can augment safety in ground-based facili-
ties, NASA KSC began a Human Factors 
Engineering (HFE) pilot project in the Space 
Station Processing Facility (SSPF). This 
project, which began in 1991, demonstrates 
the supportive role of HF in reducing acci-
dents caused by human error. 
To reduce human error and make systems 
more effective, Human Factors principles can 
be applied to system design by using features 
such as ergonomically designed displays, con-
trols, and environments; performance aids, 
appropriate labels, and fail-safe characteris-
tics. These features accommodate human 
limitations and enhance human abilities 
thereby increasing the overall system safety. 
When HF is applied to design, it assists Safety 
in achieving objectives such as: eliminating 
potential hazards, reducing risks, increasing 
operational safety, and eliminating person-
nel injuries. Through this supportive role, 
Human Factors enhances operational effi-
ciency by reducing accidents that are due to 
human error. 
Procedure 
We have completed or will complete the fol-
lowing activities to identify Human Engi-
neering(HE) design deficiencies and/or safety 
1. Review the System Design Drawings of 
the Space Station Processing Facility 
(SSPF)to Identify Man-System Interfaces 
or Relationships that pose potential 
hazards 
2. Identify potential Safety problems and or 
areas of concern 
3. Identify potential Human Errors in Op-
erational Procedures 
4. Visit other facilities at KSC to observe 
similar operations and to obtain Lessons 
Learned insights 
5. Participate in an Operating and Support 
Hazard Analysis 
6. Participate in a Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis 
7. Conduct a Critical Task Analysis 
8. Conduct an Engineering System Analysis 
OnceSafetyissuesweredocumented, we iden-
tified applicable Human Factors issues and 
findings using MIL-STD-14720 (9), NASA-
STD-3000 (2), the Human Engineering Hand-
book for Safety Assurance, [NSSl 7 40JCX] (4), 
and other applicable HF Resources. Then, we 
reassessed the beneficial aspects of applying 
HF to specific concerns of Safety within the 
SSPF. Following this, we reexamined the 
guidelines in the Human Engineering Hand-
book for Safety Assurance (4) to see if the 
requested HF data is effectively supplement-
ing the ongoing safety analyses in a timely 
manner. This is a rare opportunity to test the 
guidelines of the policies being stated in this 
Handbook prior to its official publication. 
Results 
The initial phase of our endeavor consisted of 
a review of design drawings for the SSPF. In 
this review we identified all human factors 
concerns with special emphasis on those that 
affected personnel safety, payload protection, 
and operational efficiency. When drawings 
did not completely disclose how the facility's 
characteristics would fulfill the intended op-
erational needs, we then visited other facili-
ties at KSC to obtain insights that could be 
applied to the drawing critique. 
Although our objective was to identify HF and 
Safety oversights in the SSPF, we did identify 
some very effective HE and Safety features. 
For example, Figure 1 shows the positive 
design features of the vertical access ladders 
within the facility to the crane walkways. 
This design incorporates Human Engineer-
ing design principles as stated in MIL-STD-
14720 (9) and the Safety guidelines in the 
OSHA section of the Federal Register. These 
ladders were designed to incorporate two 
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Flgure1 CraneAc::cess 
safety features: the cage, and a rest platform 
at the prescribed height. 
The original Human Fact:Drs' chart.er was t.D 
identify both positive and negative examples 
of the application of Human Factors. Later, 
the emphasis was shifted to concentrate on 
the lack of Human Fact:Drs or the Human 
Factors oversights. Other positive examples 
of good Human Engineering practices were 
uncovered, but our chart.er as restated was to 
focus on the discovery and identification of 
the HF and Safety oversights, and many of 
the positive examples remain undocumented . 
However, our review of the System Design 
Drawings has revealed a variety of Safety/ 
Human Factors problems relating to both 
operability and maintainability issues in the 
SSPF. To date, the most serious problem 
discovered originates from the design of the 
SSPF module processing layout and service 
area (Figures 2A & B and Figures 3A & B). 
The service area was designed with a CAD 
system, in which one "footprint" was created 
and then flipped repeatedly, to produce eight 
"footprints". Identical foot prints are depicted 
by similar shading (Figure 2A). These foot-
prints have mirror image symmetry, so iden-
tical gaseous stub-ups to the right side as 
personnel face the foot print (service area) are 
to the left side in reverse order when they face 
a different service area (Figure 2B). Because 
all stub-ups have similar fittings which ap-
pear identical, they are easy to confuse and 
could pose serious high pressure li ne 
mismating problems and hazards. For ex-
ample, potential high pressure line mating 
am 
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mistakes could be made when a technician 
works on one "footprint" and then moves to 
another "footprint" where stub-up layouts are 
reversed. Since at each of the gaseous stub-
ups locations, high pressure hoses are con-
nected t.D lines supplying gaseous nitrogen or 
helium at 6000, 3000 or 750 PSIG, attaching 
a line t.D the incorrect source at the wrong 
delivery pressure could be disastrous 
(Figure 3A). 
After presentation of these findings to NASA, 
it was discovered that corrective steps had 
already been taken t.D eliminate the potential 
mismating errors. 
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In addition, our investigation of the design 
drawings revealed a variety of other Safety 
and Maintenance problems in the SSPF that 
could have been/be corrected with the appli-
cation of relevant HF guidelines (Figure 4). 
Figures 5 & 6 illustrate examples of safety 
problems. Figure 5 shows an access walkway 
Rgure 3A Module Proceselng Le rout & u uuty Service 
·~ 
Figure 38 Stub-up Hardware and Leyout, Depicting the 
750, 3000, and 6000 PSIG GN2/GHe Feed Line 
Gas &lpply Outlet Ports 
where the incline angle of the ramp exceeds 
the incline allowable (using acceptable HF 
guidelines) by ten degrees. Figure 6 illus-
trates sharp corners on a stair handrail. Both 
of these figures show hazards that can cause 
an accident or injury. 
Human Factors applied to design results in 
efficient and easily maint.ained equipment 
and environments. However, the failure to 
apply HF principles can lead to overlooking a 
number of problems. Maintenance problems 
of both old and new equipment were discov-
ered in the System Drawings Review (Figure 
7-9). For example, a thirty-year-old overhead 
crane that resides in a clean-room environ-
ment poses several maintenance problems 
(Figure 7). This crane had no room for an oil 
drip pan under the oil drain plug, making oil 
removal very difficult. Before design modifi-
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cations were incorporated, five to eight gal-
lons of oil were drained into Glad plastic trash 
bags, transferred to buckets, and lowered to 
the ground 100 feet below. During this proce-
dure, maintenance personnel were required 
to adhere to strict clean room requirements. 
Elevation 
Typical Railing Details 
Scale 1" • 1'0' 
Similar Human Engineering deficiencies have 
been enoount.ered in recently purchased equip-
ment. 
AB Figure 8 and 9 illustrate, the equipment 
custom designed and purchased recently al~o 
posesoperationalmaintenanceproblems. This 
crane provides operators an inch and a half 
of clearance between the bottom of the gear 
case and the hardware protective oil drip pan. 
This clearanCe is inadequate for routine oil 
drainage. However, without major design 
modifications, thisequipmentcould have pro-
vided maintenance crews with more clear-
ance. For example, the relocation of an electri-
cal connector to the other side of the electrical 
case would have allowed the oil drip pan to be 
lowered 3 to 4 inches, providing the needed 
clearance. 
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From Figure 9, another clearance deficiency 
is apparent. A motor support cross member 
that has been positioned under the gear case 
near the oil drain plug further restricts the 
clearance making it difficult for maintenance 
to perform essential oil changes. 
Discussion 
To date, our investigation of the ~PF has 
revealed a number of Safety & Mamtenance 
Problems. These problems are a product of 
limited human factors input and NASA's pre-
ferred policy of purchasing commercial off-
the-shelf items (COTS). 
1. Currently, there is no definitive NASA 
policy guidance documentation for the broad 
application of HF standards and specifica-
tions to support the development of new 
sysU!ms and facilities. Thus, ground based 
facilities have minimum ergonomic design. 
In an effort 00 standardize the application of 
Human FacOOrs and/or Human Engineering 
within organizations under DOD the follow-
ing were developed: various DOD directives, 
(e.g., 5000.1, 5000.2, 5000.3 (6, 7, & 8)], 
along with a definitive Military Specifica-
tion, [e.g., MIL-H-46855B (5)], and a defini-
tive Military Standard, [e.g., MIL-STD-
14720 (9)). These directives should be ap-
plied to achieve an effective integration of 
man into the development of military sys-
tems, equipment, and facilities. With all 
these documents governing its policies, DOD 
has the upper hand in applying HF in most 
areas throughout the entire research and 
development process. 
The application of HF at NASA on the Space 
Station Freedom Program is governed by 
Revision A ofNASA-STD-3000 (3) primarily 
developed for flight hardware, and the basic 
Man-Systems Integration Standards (MSIS) 
(2). However, this documentation does not 
cover all HF applications. A supplement, 
Human Engineering Handbook for Safety 
Assurance NSS 1740.XX (Preliminary) (4), 
is being evaluated to determine its potential 
to bridge the gap between Safety and Hu-
man Factors. This handbook would provide 
Safety with the added benefits of Human 
Factors analytical techniques that can as-
sist in identifying error-producing sit-
uations, thus helping to reduce the poU!ntial 
for accidents. By evaluating suggested ap-
plications prior 00 the official release of the 
handbook, an opportunity is presented 00 
evaluate the effectiveness of the suggested 
procedures and to provide timely feedback 
in the form ofrecommendations for improv-
ing the handbook. 
2. In developing ground based facilities, 
NASA is trying to utilize existing compo-
nents and hardware available as off-the-
shelf items because these items are less 
expensive. Only when it is absolutely essen-
tial does NASA develop and underwrite new 
items for ground based facilities. From this 
desire to minimize cost, NASA is prevented 
from totally adopting and implementing the 
Human Factors application system devel-
oped and enacted by DOD. 
If Human Factors principles are not applied 
00 facilities, such as the SSPF, and 00 equip-
ment, such as the heavy-lift crane, resulting 
safety problems can contribute 00 serious ac-
cidents and/or costly delays. This point can be 
illustrated by the mishap on the Magellan 
Spacecraft that occurred while it was being 
prepared for launch. In October of 1988 in a 
Flight Hardware Processing Facility at KSC, 
maintenance personnel performed a service 
operation on a piece of flight hardware. Dur-
ing this operation, a technician was required 
00 make three very difficult blind connections. 
These circumstances combined with 
other factors contributed to an incident 
causing a fire that consumed all the combus-
tible wire harness material from the connec-
t.or back to the battery. This resulted in a 
costly delay. 
A summary of the Magellan Mishap Inves-
tigation(FigurelO)identifiessomeofthemajor 
incident contributors and categorizes each 
incident contributor as 00 its problem type, 
and specific area of responsibility by disci-
pline.Although this is flight hardware and we 
are dealing exclusively with ground support 
hardware, the same type of accident with the 
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Figure 10 An Analytical summary of the Magellan 
SpaeeerattMlshap 
same causes can occur on either type of hard-
ware. From Figure 10, it is apparent that 
some of the facOOrs were design induced, 
while others resulted from the use of incor-
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rect hardware, and others from the use of 
incorrect procedures. This accidentshould 
not have happened and could have been 
prevented through the application ofHuman 
Factors. 
At the conclusion of the mishap investigation, 
one of the predominant findings stated by Jon 
Busse, the Chairman of the Magellan Mishap 
Board, was: the lack of Hu.man Factors prin-
ciples being applied du.ring the design of the 
space craft was a significant factor and more 
specifically . . 
The lack of Human Factors being applied 
during the development of the operational 
procedures and during the evaluation of es-
sential provisions which are utilized during 
bothoperationalservicingandtheperformance 
of routine maintenance operations also were 
major contributors to this incident. 
Conclusion 
Maintenance & Safety problems, such as those 
we encountered in the SSPF, can be pre-
vented or rectified with the application of 
Human Factors principles. To overcome ob-
stacles, such as NASA's cost effective ap-
proach, HF specialists must develop creative 
new approaches to implement HF at NASA. 
These approaches must identify the ways and 
means to provide HF in a timely manner and 
on a cost effective basis. Presently, several 
candidate methods are under considerat'ion 
for implementation. 
1) Develop a Designer's Application Guide of 
Human Factors Design Principles and incor-
porate it into NASA's requirements to ensure 
consideration of Human Factors. This is es-
sential, because the complexity of many new 
systems make it impractical or exceedingly 
costly to incorporate changes after items are 
produced. 
2) Develop effective Human Factors pur-
chasing specifications, stressing maintain-
ability, operability, accessibility, and other 
important HF principles to augment KSC-
DE-512-SM (1). These specifications would 
help to eliminate maintenance problems such 
as the restricted clearance found in the new 
crane (Figure 7 & 8). 
3) Develop and utilize a systematic means to 
apply Human Factors in the preparation of 
Operational Procedures. 
4) Develop a Human Factors modeling tech-
nique for conducting Human Engineering 
evaluations in conjunction with Engineering 
Prototyping in a Computer Aided Design 
(CAD) environment. Currently, a 3-0 Ani-
mated Design Visualization Modeling Pro-
gram is used as an aid for facility design. A 
shortcoming of this model is that the software's 
mannequins can not effectively demonstrate 
the man-machine interface because they can 
not be animated to perform selected tasks. 
The mannequins are static and act only as 
scaled props. Therefore, the influence of a 3-
D Animated Model has great potential for 
enhancing the Design Visualization and Hu-
man Factors Engineering design capability. 
Presently, HF prototyping can be accom-
plished in a Computer Aided Design (CAD) 
environment, through the use of an anthro-
pometric modeling software called JACK. 
This software can be used to evaluate a vari-
ety of human factors concerns, ergonomic 
issues, biomechanical issues, and specific man-
machine interfaces. This can be accomplished 
by using an animated mannequin to demon-
strate the following: 
(1) Reach and space relationships 
(2) Man-machine visual links 
(3) Performance of selected operational 
and maintenance tasks 
(4) Workspace requirements a nd opera-
tional tolerance, and 
(5) Body sizing constraints 
Currently, it is feasible to conduct electronic 
HF simulations of specific workspaces by uti-
lizing scaled mannequins to perform selected 
activities. Activities that a re to be evaluated 
would be chosen on a criticality and/or high 
risk basis. The electronic Mrun through" of the 
activit ies is an inexpensive way to identify 
design problems and potential hazards. 
Theanthropometricmoclelingsoftwarewould 
take advantage of the computer resources 
presently available at KSC, such as Space 
Station Freedom's facility details stored in 
electronic data bases on NASA's Intergraph 
CAD system. Through the application of HF 
in the design and developmentofsystemsand 
facilities, this software could reduce accident 
s ituat ions due to human error. 
This modeling capability is currently under 
development in an early prototype stage. The 
init ial effort will allow engineering designs 
and models to be moved from the KSC 
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Intergraph Workstations to a Silicon Graph-
ics Onyx/2RE2 Workstation. 
We have demonstrated that Operability, 
Maintainabifity and Safety problems can be 
identified by a Human Factors Specialist and 
that these problems can be rectified through 
the development of creative new approaches 
to implementing Human Factors principles. 
Possible approaches include the development 
of Human Factors purchasing specifications, 
designerapplicationguides,systematicmeans 
to apply Human Factors to operations and the 
use of a 3-D animated design visualization 
modeling program. Failure to improve or ap-
ply sound Human Factors principles to ground 
based facilities and equipment at KSC can be 
costly and dangerous, such as the fire on 
Magellan. Although our pilot program is not 
complete, to date it demonstrates that Hu-
man Factors in a supportive role can assist 
NASA Safety in the reduction and/or elimina-
tion of accident situations due to human er-
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